Indirect knowledge (parokṣa jñāna) in Jainism is knowledge that is not grasped directly by the soul without any mediation. It is understood through certain intermediate means. The classical Jain list of parokṣa pramāṇas is fivefold:

• Smṛti ( स्मृति ) — Memory or recollection. It means knowledge that arises when the mind’s past impressions (saṃskāras) are revived, allowing one to recognize something previously experienced. It is a form of indirect knowledge because it depends on past experiences and their impressions.

• Pratyabhijñāna ( प्रत्यभिज्ञान ) — Recognition. This is the grasp that identifies an object as the same or similar to something previously known, often described as “this is that” or “this is like that.” It relies on memory plus present perception.

• Tarka ( तर्क ) — Reasoning/logic. This is the process of establishing vyāpti (invariable connection) between a probans (hetu) and saḏḍhya (the predicate to be proven). It is a critical form of parokṣa knowledge used to reason about relationships and co-presence/co-absence of phenomena.

• Anumāna ( अनुमान ) — Inference. Knowledge derived from a valid hetu (reason) that is invariably connected with the saḏḍhya. It is the knowledge of what follows from a recognized sign or basis.

• Āgama ( आगम ) — Scriptural testimony. Knowledge gained from the words of a reliable source (aptā). In Jainism, the Śruti/Svārat-āpta tradition regards the words of an apta as a separate pramāṇa, either for oneself (svārth pramāṇa) or for others (parārtha pramāṇa).

Notes for clarity:

• Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions both accept parokṣa jñāna and the same fivefold categories, though emphasis and phrasing may vary in their canonical commentaries.
• These parokṣa forms are considered indirect because they depend on senses, mind, memory, or external testimony, and they are distinct from the direct (parokṣa-free) knowledge of kevalajñāna (omniscience).

If you’d like, I can give short, traditional definitions (arth) for each term in the exact Jain sutras or commentaries.