Your objection is understandable, but in Jain philosophy the conclusion “therefore no one is responsible” does not follow.

1) Karma does not erase the doer’s responsibility

In Jainism, if a person dies in an accident, that event may be seen as the result of multiple causes:

• the visible external cause, such as the accident itself,
• the living being’s own karmic conditions,
• and the conduct of the other person involved.

But this does not mean the doer is innocent. A person who drives carelessly, acts with negligence, violence, anger, intoxication, or disregard for life still creates his own karma through that very act. Jainism never says, “Because the victim had karma, the offender is free.” That would be a serious distortion.

In Jain thought:

• the victim’s karmas explain why that soul encountered that suffering,
• the offender’s intentional or negligent act explains why that person bound new karma.

So both sides remain morally accountable.

2) This is not akriyavada

Akriyavada means the view that action has no real moral consequence. Jainism rejects that completely.

Jainism teaches:

• action binds karma,
• intention matters,
• negligence matters,
• violence matters,
• purification is possible through right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct.

So Jain karma theory is the opposite of akriyavada. It is a very strict doctrine of moral causation.

3) It is also not fatalism

Fatalism would mean:

• whatever happens is fixed,
• effort is useless,
• moral striving is meaningless.

Jainism does not say that. It says:

• past karma shapes present conditions,
• but present effort can reduce, transform, and destroy karma.

This is why Jainism strongly teaches:

• self-restraint,
• vigilance,
• penance,
• non-violence,
• right conduct.

If everything were fully fixed, these practices would be meaningless. But in Jainism, they are essential.

4) On moral responsibility

Jain ethics is actually very demanding. A person is responsible for:

• what they do directly,
• what they cause others to do,
• what they approve of,
• and even what they fail to prevent when they have the capacity and duty to act.

So Jainism does not excuse cruelty by saying, “the victim deserved it.” That is not Jain dharma.

5) About anekantavada and syadvada

Your second point is important.

Anekantavada

Anekantavada means reality is many-sided. No single viewpoint captures the whole of reality.

This does not mean:

• all views are equally true,
• truth is impossible,
• or knowledge is useless.

It means truth is complex, and different statements may be true from different standpoints.

Syadvada

Syadvada means: “in some respect,” “from a particular standpoint,” or “conditionally.”

So a Jain statement is not:

• “This is the whole truth in every respect,”

but rather:

• “This is true from this particular standpoint.”

That is not skepticism. It is precision.

6) Syadvada does not destroy pramana

You suggested that if every answer is conditioned by syadvada, then no answer can be complete knowledge.

In Jain epistemology, this is exactly the point:

• ordinary statements are partial,
• but partial truth is still real truth, when properly qualified.

Jainism distinguishes:

• pramana: valid knowledge,
• naya: partial standpoint.

A statement can be valid as a pramana within its proper limits, while still not claiming absolute completeness.

So if I say:

• “This act is violent,”

that can be true.

If I add:

• “From another standpoint, the same event involves multiple causal conditions,”

that is also true.

Syadvada does not make truth impossible; it prevents dogmatism.

7) The key mistake in the objection

The mistake is to think: > “If the victim’s karma is involved, then the doer is not responsible.”

Jainism does not say that.

It says:

• each soul bears responsibility for its own intentions and actions,
• while karmic conditions explain why certain events unfold.

Thus:

• the victim’s karma explains the victim’s experience,
• the offender’s karma explains the offender’s bondage.

Both are true simultaneously, from their respective standpoints.

8) Final point

So Jainism is neither:

• fatalistic,
• akriyavada,
• nor moral relativist.

It is a doctrine of:

• moral responsibility,
• causal complexity,
• non-absolutism,
• and spiritual self-effort.

If you want, I can also give this same answer in a more formal philosophical Jain argument form with premises and conclusion.